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1. INTRODUCTION
The EOS program opens a new era in unmanned spacecraft, both in
technology and management concepts. Accompanying this new era of
spacecraft technology are fiscal constraints which require innovative
approaches to achieve minimum costs - costs that are predictable with
a high confidence.
The primary emphasis during the first decade and a half of space
flight has been on performance. New technologies to be explored, new
hardware to be developed, new techniques to accomplish, new tasks all
required large staffs of scientists and engineers together with new facili-
ties and equipment. Obviously cost goals were far down on the list of
priorities. Contracts for many programs were in fact structured so that
there were built-in incentives for both the contractor and contracting
agency keeping costs up.
Today "space" is a maturing industry and the emphasis must shift
to make cost the primary priority. Precedents exist in other industries,
where competitive cost pressures have forced such reemphasis -- for
example, nuclear power. In a coming era of a substantially static space
budget, only by lowering space costs can we increase the total number
of space flights. These points are well discussed by A. O. Tischler who
said:
"The first decade of space was characterized by unprecedented
missions, each pushing technological frontiers on many
boundaries. The pioneering thrust made performance and
mission success the governing objectives, with cost a dependent
variable.
Now space programs have acheived a maturity that permits
confidence in the ability to do difficult missions. Many of
the necessary technologies have progressed well up the
learning curve, and additional performance gains are often
unnecessary. At such a point, cost should become a para-
meter in design. The "best" design, always a compromise,
must now mean "best value. " The new problem is to enhance
the productivity of the space program in practical uses for
direct benefit'of the public. "
1 "Lower Space Costs Mean More Space Flight," A. O. Tischler,
June 1974, Astronautics and Aeronautics
i.- i
The spacecraft industry has matured to the point that existing
technology can be used to produce off-the-shelf hardware elements that
will adequately perform to typical EOS type multimission requirements.
The innovative portion of thi.s new program and the method for establishing
improved low-cost production and testing techniques are also available.
These techniques hinge on our ability to produce both payload and
standard subsystem modules that provide performance versatility to span
wide ranges of mission and interface margins (i. e., launch vehicle, EMC,
data bus, power distribution, structure, and thermal) without expensive
testing, or loss of confidence. The key is a sound prediction of the re-
quirements and technical capabilities for missions that are 10 to 15 years
in the future. Following this approach, a substantial increase can be
made in the fraction of program funding directed toward advancing payload
technology and/or data usefulness rather than the spacecraft.
The EOS modular approach to provide multimission research/
operational spacecraft provides more data-per-dollar than any previous
program:
* By integrating each major standard spacecraft subsystem into a
self-contained module, we have a flexible spacecraft which
accommodates many different payload complements and orbit
parameters.
* Modularity makes feasible the in-orbit servicing of the Obser-
vatory by Space Shuttle for maintenance or updating. Previous
studies have shown Shuttle servicing to be an economical approach
to spacecraft system maintenance.
Standardizing modules as far as practicable is accomplished for EOS
by isolating the system elements that are independent of payload character-
istics, and then grouping these payload-independent elements into
subsystem-related functions; the result is a logical module complement
usable for many diverse missions with minimum change. Such a module
may be specified, procured, tested, and stockpiled for later synthesis
of operational observatories.
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i. i COST SAVINGS THROUGH DESIGN APPROACH
(Estimated savings - 25% noncurring, 10% recurring)
* The modularity concept requires a new set of design guidelines
if it is to function properly. These guidelines must include the
following:
Segment each design aspect into its own cubicle and write an
independent and complete specification to cover this aspect.
Tie each of these segments together with a carefully prepared
set of interface specifications. These interface specifications
must be clean and concise and allow work to be accomplished
at varied locations with excellent fit and performance antici-
pated at observatory integration.
Adequate interface margins, i. e., larger than currently
designed for, must be incorporated if the required fit and
performance are to be achieved. In addition, these margins
must be large enough to accommodate a wide spectrum of
future payloads.
- Develop a system which emphatically discourages any modifica-
tion to or variation from the interface specifications without
thorough knowledge of the impact.
* Higher risk factors (reduced test and verification) can be tolerated
in the EOS design than in any previous program, since the Shuttle
can be relied on for refurbishment and/or retrieval of the Obser-
vatory. Increasing the risk factors allows larger interface mar-
gins and this, as previously mentioned, is of tremendous
importance to a proper modular fit and performance with limited
testing.
* Currently a great deal of spacecraft design incorporates internal
redundancy within the black box. This does not allow the NASA
project manager any reliability/cost tradeoff flexibility. It is
proposed for the standard modules on EOS that redundancy be
incorporated, wherever possible, at the black box level. This
allows the NASA project manager, when EOS becomes operational,
to purchase the redundancy level that best fits his needs.
* During the design phase, cost budgets between the project manager
and module managers should be established, agreed upon, and
carefully adhered to. In addition, it is recommended that a spec-
ial award system be instituted to encourage spending less dollars
than the budget. Although cost budgets are difficult to arrive at,
the maturity of spacecraft technology today and judicious appraisal
of previous programs permit accurate goals to be established.
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i. 2 COST SAVINGS IN MANUFACTURE AND TEST
(Estimated savings - 10% recurring)
* Two different approaches to reduced-cost EOS manufacturing
are possible:
Dollar savings can be realized by allowing the manufacturing
at a low overhead facility while the design and development
(through drawings and specifications) are performed at one of
the high technology (higher overhead) companies. A certain
amount of relaxation, in terms of paperwork and controls
and use of existing procedures, should also be a part of this
particular low-cost package.
Establish a facility as part of a high technology company
where approximately 90 percent of the total EOS Observatory
(excepting payloads) could be designed, developed, fabricated,
integrated, and tested. This reduces immensely the problems
and cost of communications between companies and allows for.
better development of team morale and closer coordination
with the customer.
* Perform extensive qualification testing to validate the modular
design parameters and limit acceptance testing at spacecraft
and observatory level. This significantly reduces costs com-
pared to the conventional approach.
* Employ a single contractor to perform the integration and test
functions for both modules and observatory. One test laboratory
and the same personnel are used to preclude redundant testing
between the module and observatory levels, only one set of EGSE
and MGSE are required, start-up and familiarization costs are
greatly reduced and the use of similar plans and procedures for
the module and observatory further reduces costs.
* Establish a central parts procurement program to procure high-
usage parts in large lots. This ensures a supply of high-
reliability parts at considerably less cost and eliminates schedule
problems caused by parts availability.
* Maintain a strong parts standardization program. This reduces
costs while providing parts that have been thoroughly tested and
are available for large lot buys.
* To cut quality assurance costs, utilize the contractor's existing
Quality Manual in lieu of preparing a new plan for EOS, reduce
inspection documentation, allow the contractor to control disposi-
tion of inconsequential discrepancies, and use standard contractor
functional audits in place of special project audits.
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* Reduce reliability engineering costs by limiting failure modes
and effects analysis primarily to areas concerning interfaces
between boxes, reducing the formality of failure reporting and
analysis, limiting reliability assessment analysis, and providing
only summary data as formal documentation.
i. 3 COST SAVINGS THROUGH ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
(Estimated savings - 10% nonrecurring, 5% recurring)
* Definitive requirements, well-understood specifications, agree-
ment on design approach, and well understood costs at the out-
set - these are the major factors in achieving a low-cost program.
This is where program costs have typically gone "out-of-sight"
because performance specifications prove to be pushing the state
of the art unbeknown to either the government or the contractor.
To preclude this on the EOS program, we recommend that the
first phase of the program be devoted to an in-depth reexamina-
tion of the Phase B effort by a relatively small team of senior
engineers. This team should work from 3 to 6 months to deter-
mine with high confidence all basic technical performance
requirements before the detailed design and hardware phase
commences.
* A dedicated project type organization with all the design per-
sonnel collocated in one facility is the most cost-effective
approach for a spacecraft design that is within the state of the
art. Collocating a strong NASA management team in the project
office facilitates communications and allows timely decisions.
* The most cost-effective project control system uses the contrac-
tor's existingsystem. Coupled with an earned value capability
(for progress measurement) and a design-to-cost system (for
recurring cost measurement), the contractors internal system
can provide the basic data needed by internal EOS project manage-
ment to control cost and schedule performance and to report
progress to NASA.
* Manpower costs will be reduced by limiting formal design reviews
to the module level (and higher), and holding only informal
reviews at the black box level. At formal reviews customer
participation is at its peak and the contractor responds with an
and excessive expenditure of manpower/costs. Requiring only
informal working reviews at the black box level minimizes this
type of response.
* For formal configuration control with the customer, limit control
documents to the statement of work, system specification, and
interface control specifications. Release black box specifications
after the critical design review and allow control by the subsystem
manager.
* Document preparation costs can be reduced by deleting the formal
submission requirement for many documents and using informal
information available at the contractors. A preliminary EOS
documents list is provided in Section 2.
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i. 4 COST SAVINGS THROUGH METHOD OF CONTRACTING
(Estimated savings - 15% nonrecurring, 5% recurring)
* NASA continues as the contracting agency for the payload through-
out the program. This approach provides the greatest confidence
and the lowest cost, since NASA already has an experienced team
developing EOS instruments and G and A is eliminated. (Techni-
cal assistance can be provided by the contractor, as required.)
* A combination CPIF/CPAF contract is used for the systems inte-
grator. CPIF incentives are used on cost and measureable
parameters, while CPAF incentives are used on non-quantifiable
parameters, such as management performance and payload inter-
face management.
* The "Contract Changes" clause is eliminated and every departure
from the original negotiated agreement is done by bilateral action
(supplemental agreement). This eliminates questionable changes
and decreases the cost of contract change administration.
* The contract provides zero fee for all contractor-initiated changes
and doubles the fee rate for all NASA-directed changes. This
discourages change activity on the part of both parties.
* All program cost savings originated by the contractor are shared
on a predetermined percentage basis to motivate the contractor
to cut costs.
* A formal contractor program is implemented for cost awareness
and personnel motivation.
Further details on the management techniques summarized above
are included in Sections 2 through 5 of this report.
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2. MANAGEMENT APPROACH
2. 1 INTRODUCTION
During the EOS System Definition Study, we performed management
analyses and tradeoffs to determine the most cost-effective simplified
management approach for the EOS Phase C/D. Three basic objectives
had to be met by the selected management approach.
1) It must be scheduled and organized to produce the most cost
effective approach
2) It must give an accurate measurement of progress
3) It must provide a system for measuring and controlling the
recurring production costs of the spacecraft modules.
To meet the.se goals we recommend:
* A startup phase of 3 to 6 months by a small team of senior
engineers who will continue to reexamine multimission flexibility
and provide clean interface margins
* A dedicated project type organization, with senior NASA personnel
collocated in the project office to increase communications and
allow timely decisions
* Utilizing a program control system with an earned value capability
(for progress measurement) and a design-to-cost system (for
recurring cost measurement) coupled with a streamlined project
planning approach; a low-cost performance measurement system
(PMS) can be implemented that serves the contractor's internal
EOS project management and also provides a basis for developing
data to be submitted to NASA
* Formal design reviews be limited to system and subsystem level,
and informal reviews used at the black box level
* A simplified manual schedule control system be used
* For formal configuration control, limit the control documents to
the statement of work, system specification, and interface control
specifications. Release black box specifications after critical
design review and allow control by the subsystem manager.
* Limit required documentation and distribution of documents.
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The following paragraphs describe these recommendations and
summarize the rationale for their use in reducing EOS costs.
2.2 CONTRACT STARTUP PHASE
In the Phase B study reports and in the proposal for Phase C/D, the
contractor identifies specific design concepts. These design concepts
have been prepared without the benefit of in-depth discussions with NASA
because of government restrictions during the competitive procurement.
After a contractor is selected these concepts are usually modified to
incorporate specific customer suggestions, since this is the first time
a complete exchange of ideas is permitted. These modifications cause
problems if the program starts in the normal mode with strong schedule
and performance pressures. In addition, in the early design phase of the
program new design requirements are usually discovered - again causing
a program perturbation. These changes have significant cost implications,
especially if they are implemented while the program is proceeding at
full speed.
To avoid these problems, TRW recommends that the first phase of the
the EOS program be devoted to an in-depth reexamination of the Phase B
effort by a relatively small team of senior engineers. The work should
proceed to a level that permits all basic technical performance require-
ments to be determined with high confidence before the detailed design and
hardware phase commences. Sufficient time must be allowed to work the
design in an optimum environment (without the high pressure of schedule
and normal program cost expenditures). This effort, lasting 3 to 6 months,
should remove any unknowns in the program and allow the program to
proceed with a much lower cost risk.
2.3 PROGRAM ORGANIZATION
We examined the various types of organizations used for managing
spacecraft programs in the past and concluded that a dedicated project
type organization with all the design personnel collocated in one facility
is the most cost effective approach for a spacecraft design that is within
the state of the art. The EOS design criteria fits this requirement. This
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type of organization is especially suitable for a program that is low-cost
oriented, since it allows close fiscal controls. We also recommend that
NASA consider collocating a strong management team at the contractor's
facility to increase efficiencies in communication between the two organiza-
tions. Significant cost reduction would be possible if the collocated NASA
team is given sufficient decision-making authority; important decisions
can be made in a timely manner, and the documentation preparation and
general paper flow would be reduced. A suggested project organization is
shown in Figure 2-1.
EOS /
PROGRAM MANAGER
ASOUCE CONTRACTSASSURANCE
INTEGRATION PAYLOAD SPACECRAFT SYSTEM GROUND DATA
AND TEST MODULES MODULES ENGINEERING HANDLING
PAYLOAD
SPACECRAFT
Figure 2-1. EOS Project Organization
This project organization is responsible for overall project technical,
cost, and schedule performance, and specifically responsible for:
* Realizing the goals of a low-cost development
* Project systems engineering, and integration and technical
project management through all phases of the project
* Official communications and liaison with NASA and other project
elemerits
* Establishment and control of overall project budgets, schedules,
and in keeping with the strong cost objectives of the program to
produce the most efficient organization possible
* Management of the activities of all personnel assigned directly
to the project.
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As the program proceeds through the phases of design, development,
manufacturing, test, and integration, the project organization is modified
to phase out completed operations and strengthen other operations. The
final major phase of the program, integration and test, would have the
reduced project office shown in Figure 2-2.
2.4 PROJECT MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
The results of our management tradeoff studies clearly indicate that
the salient elements of the contractor's existing project management sys-
tems should be utilized to establish the most cost-effective method for
management control for the EOS Phase C/D Project. In addition to the
basic tools used for manage-
EOS PROGRAMMANAGER FOR ment control (design reviews
INTEGRATION
AND TEST for technical performance,
schedule control for program
status, and cost reporting for
ASSURANCE financial status), an earned
value system is recommended
which relates cost, schedule,
and technical progress to give
PLANNING INTEG TION PAYLOAD an accurate picture of overall
AND CONTROL OPERATIONS INTEGRATION
program status. These man-
Figure 2-2. Project Organization for agement techniques are
Final Phase described below.
2. 4. 1 Design Review
The primary purpose of a design review is to ascertain if the design
approach agrees with the specification and cost goals. To ensure these
goals are met in EOS, we recommend:
o Limit formal design reviews to the system and subsystem level
and hold only informal reviews at the black box level. At formal
reviews customer participation is at its peak and the contractor
responds with an excessive expenditure of manpower/cosLs. By
requiring only informal working reviews at the black box level,
frequent customer interchange occurs without the need for a
massive immediate response by the design group. Customer's
recommendations are then evaluated and incorporated in the
normal everyday work.
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* Specialists from manufacturing, test, and costing will form the,
core of the design review team. The reviews will stress the
cost of development and production.
2. 4. 2 Schedule Control
EOS schedule control would be keyed to scheduled milestones pre-
selected by NASA Goddard and the EOS managers responsible for accom-
plishing the major tasks as established in the work breakdown structure
(WBS). In assisting NASA in arriving at the schedule, we recommend the
integrating contractor optimize the schedule (spacecraft, instruments, and
ground data handling system) for the lowest cost, and not for an arbitrary
launch date. This would provide NASA the basis for further cost
reductions.
The procedures required for operating the schedule control system
for EOS would be primarily manual; they are simplified to produce the
basic information at minimum cost. The master program schedule (MPS)
would depict negotiated contract milestone item delivery requirements,
major demonstration (design reviews) and test points, formal documenta-
tion delivery requirements, and other critical control milestones.
The summary logic network will be the basic schedule tool used to
evaluate EOS project critical paths and to monitor at the project level.
The summary logic network should contain approximately 300 top level
events summarizing the total project. This network would be derived
from, and continually integrated with, the milestone scheduling and
update. The network would be a calendarized, pictorial, logic network
showing key interfaces of the EOS project. Update would be done manually
using the input/output data of the milestone scheduling. It would be the
key schedule document used by the contractor for internal project level
management and project level reporting to NASA Goddard.
Control milestones recognizing significant constraints would be
established for each project phase and interrelated to WBS elements to
provide the skeletal framework for constructing detailed plans for each
subsystems participation. Milestone schedules would be developed within
the subproject organization for all identified cost accounts and correlated
within the WBS framework.
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Schedule performance data would be prepared, reviewed, and sub-
mitted at the total EOS project level monthly. This top system cycle is
focused at levels 1 and 2 of the WBS for management by NASA Goddard
and the contractor's EOS project manager. Informal schedule monitoring
and updating is done on a weekly basis.
2. 4. 3 Cost Control System
The EOS Phase C/D would utilize the standard contractor's account-
ing system which identifies all expenditures incurred by the project and
records the information in a common data base. The cost control system
takes the output of the financial accounting system to provide the reports
necessary for effective project control. These reports fully meet the
NASA 533 series report requirements.
2. 4. 4 Earned Value Measurement
We recommend that an earned value type of progress measurement
be utilized on the EOS program. Earned value measurement is a tech-
nique which relates schedule, costs, and technical progress in such a
manner that an accurate measurement of total program progress can be
ascertained. It will be particularly helpful for EOS in detecting problems
at an early stage so that corrective action can be applied before serious
program deficiencies can happen. It should be emphasized that earned
value measures work progress and not technical performance. As
mentioned earlier, the quality of technical performance is determined at
design reviews.
Each month the various responsible managers provide an objective
assessment of the percent completion of the planned tasks. The percent-
age completion numbers are multiplied by the total budgeted amount giving
the earned value of the work accomplished. This number is compared
with the actual expenditure of EOS funds; any difference in costs gives a
good indication whether overall progress is ahead or behind schedule.
A monthly report, the progress measurement report, is produced
at the subsystem functional level and is the principa -ttol used in analyzing
EOS progress measurement.
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2.4. 5 Reporting, Analysis, and Review
The performance measurement report would-be used in conjunction
with technical performance reviews, design-to-cost, and schedule control
to allow managers to identify and analyze variances.
The EOS project manager would employ both formal and informal
methods to monitor and control the technical achievement, including
project reviews, technical interchange meetings, 'informal coordination
meetings, and monthly progress reports. Areas covered include:
1) progress according to detailed milestone schedule, 2) inconsistencies
or incompatibilities in the system specificatidns, 3) outstanding or potentia
problems and proposed solutions, 4) design-to-cost performance, and
5) cost performance.
2. 5 DESIGN-TO-COST
Since the design life cycle of the spacecraft modules is 10 to
15 years, the recurring cost for fabrication of the modules is a very
important factor for a cost-effective program. Because of this factor,
TRW recommends that a design-to-cost program be utilized on the EOS
program since it emphasizes the- importance of module recurring cost.
The following sections describe how a design-to-cost could be implemented
on EOS.
2. 5. 1 General
A design-to-cost implementation approach requires early identifica-
tion of cost/performance alternatives for both internal tradeoff decisions
and customer evaluation purposes. Responsibilities for implementation of
design-to-cost would be assigned to managers, designers, and cost
estimators. Allocated production cost goals, cost estimating, and pro-
gress tracking would be used for control purposes. The design-to-cost
approach involves the following fundamental features:
* Establishment and allocation of an EOS system recurring produc-
tion cost goal as a design parameter coequal with program
specifications.
* A formalized approach for tracking calculated recurring costs
against allocated module recurring production cost goals through-
out the entire program.
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" Continuous tradeoff activities between cost, performance, and
requirements to achieve a demonstrated recurring production
cost goal at the end of the program.
* Iteration of the life-cycle-cost model in tradeoffs to minimize
total life cycle costs.
Figure 2-3 shows an implementation flow diagram for a design-to-
cost effort and the application of the life-cycle-cost model.
2. 5. 2 Management for Low Cost
2. 5. 2. 1 Design-to-Cost Manager
A design-to-cost manager, reporting to the project manager, would
be responsible for implementing the design-to-cost program. Together
with cost estimating personnel, subcontracts and materiel representatives,
and designers, the manager develops design-to-cost allocations for each
module. If a problem develops in meeting the design-to-cost allocation
for a given subsystem, he will assess the situation and recommend realign-
ment of design-to-cost allocations for other modules, if feasible, or use
of the design-to-cost allocation reserve to resolve the specific problem.
The operation of the life-cycle-cost model is also the responsibility
of the design-to-cost manager. He assures that the model is used appro-
priately in carrying out tradeoffs and monitors results to provide manage-
ment visibility.
2. 5. 2. 2 Use of Design-to-Cost Reserve
This reserve would be the source for implementing design changes
in support of design-to-cost achievement. If a preliminary design has
met technical specifications, but cost estimating indicates that the allocated
design-to-cost goal has not been met, the project manager will utilize
design-to-cost reserve to authorize design iteration effort to reduce
costs.
2. 5. 2. 3 Tradeoff Implementation
Basic to the design-to-cost philosophy is a necessity to perform
tradeoffs during all phases of the program and at all levels of the design.
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Figure 2-3. Design-to-Cost Implementation Flow Diagram
If possible, within the minimum equipment performance and logistics
requirements, performance can be traded for reduced cost. If it becomes
evident that it will not be possible to meet minimum technical requirements
without exceeding the design-to-cost goal, a study is to be prepared for
review which enumerates alternatives, including life-cycle-cost effects.
To aid designers in making tradeoff evaluations and reducing produc-
tion costs of their designs, cost estimators should be provided to give
real-time production cost estimates for proposed designs and design
alternates. In addition, designers would be provided with guidelines for
piece parts and packaging costs.
2. 5. 3 Establishing the Design-to-Cost Goal
The EOS design-to-cost goal should be established as a recurring
production cost. This design-to-cost goal would be negotiated between
the customer and the contractor utilizing the best estimate of recurring
production cost based on a system design which has been optimized as
much as is feasible for minimum life-cycle-costs. The recurring cost
will be allocated to the modules for lower level tracking purposes by the
contractor.
2. 5. 4 Tracking and Reporting
In order to ensure real-time estimates to designers, dedicated
material and manufacturing cost estimators, assigned to the design groups,
can be very useful in providing real-time estimates. A key tool that can
be used by cost estimators to provide real-time cost estimates to designers
is a design-to-cost estimating model which is computer programmed.
Figure 2-4 shows the characteristics of a TRW model along with the type
of input required and output information. Through the use of this cost
estimating approach, designers are able to see the effects of design changes
while there is still adequate time to examine design alternatives.
The design-to-cost current estimates should be summarized at
least monthly and reported by the design-to-cost manager to the project
manager. The design-to-cost manager continuously tracks the latest cost
estimates from the design areas and from subcontract administrators for
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buy equipment and reports any significant changes at weekly project
reviews. The tracking and reporting system, in addition to supporting the
unit production cost estimates for major customer reviews, would provide
the information needed to identify potential tradeoffs between performance
and cost.
2.5. 5 Status Reviews
Design-to-cost reviews would be held in conjunction with all equip-
ment formal reviews (refer to Section 2. 4. 1). At these reviews, the
current production cost and technical performance estimates would be
reviewed along with a substantiation of the data, assumptions, and methods
used to generate the estimates. A formal analysis of any significant cost
and/or performance problems affecting life-cycle-cost would be presented
with tradeoff and analysis. results leading to possible solutions.
2.6 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
A formalized, properly structured configuration management (CM)
system will reduce EOS costs by:
* Timely customer interface
* Simple baseline control
" Progressively increasing the degree of configuration manage-
ment as the design becomes firmer
* Practicing multiple levels of configuration management.
The following configuration management approach is recommended
to reduce EOS costs.
2. 6. 1 Baseline Control
The basic documents influencing the conduct of the program should
be limited to the statement of work, system specification, and interface
control drawings (ICD's) and should under the control of the customer.
Any Class I changes affecting these documents are subject to customer
approval. Subservient specifications such as subsystem and black box
specifications should be reviewed with the customer in frequent design
IRECEDINAG PTAGE BLANIK NBDT A[M 2
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review or working meetings without formal approval required from the
customer. These specifications would be under the direct control of the
prime contractor.
The requirement for Part I and Part II type specifications should be
deleted and a basic specification developed. Initially, this specification
would contain only the requirements; as the design progresses, new details
would be added to the basic specification. This deletes the requirement
for identifying and controlling two separate specifications for the same
item.
The functional configuration audit and the physical configuration
audit should be combined into one audit. This reduces the cost of con-
ducting two separate audits.
From a contractual standpoint only one contract end item should be
identified. This would normally occur at the spacecraft level. Configured
items below the spacecraft should be under the control of the design con-
tractor. This avoids the necessity of processing Class I engineering
changes to a lower level of spacecraft than is required. Customer control
of the configuration would continue to be exercised through the statement
of work, system specification, and ICD's.
2. 6. 2 Configuration Control
Black box specifications would be released after the subsystem
critical design review (CDR) and would be controlled by the applicable
subsystem manager. Changes affecting other subsystems would still be
directed to the configuration management office. Changes occurring
within the applicable subsystem would be handled internally within the
subsystem until product baseline, which occurs subsequent to functional
configuration audit/physical configuration audit.
A multilevel change control procedure is advocated:
Level Change Approval Authority Baseline
Spacecraft NASA/prime contractor Functional
Subsystem interface document Design contractor Allocated
specification tree
Black box or module Subsystem manager Product
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Class I changes shall be limited as they affect the contract, state-
ment of work, system specification, and ICD's. All other changes will
be classified as Class II and will be internally controlled from contract
go-ahead to product baseline.
2.7 REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION
Through the years, the list of required documentation has steadily
grown with each succeeding spacecraft contract. Part of this growth is
due to the requirements for strong government review of contractor
activities, formal documentation required by government specifications,
and the natural proliferation of documents due to large contractor organiza
tions. In addition to the many types of documents is the large number of
copies required for a swollen distribution list.
TRW has studied this problem for the EOS program and attempted
to make a significant reduction in the variety of documents and their
distribution. Two important groundrules were used in preparing the
documentation list:
* The system contractor would only prepare those documents that
are essential to his internal operations
* Documents delivered to NASA for information or approval would
be limited to those that ha've contractual implications or concerne(
with basic program planning.
In addition to the basic documentation list are the many documents
required for the normal internal management control systems such as
configuration management, quality control, cost and schedule control, etc.
It is not planned that nay special documentation would be prepared for the
customer in these areas. The customer would keep informed of these
activities through informal reviews and meetings with his residence
personnel.
Using the previously stated groundrules, the documentation list is
reduced to that shown in Table 2-1. TRW believes this document list
meets the NASA intent for low-cost programs.
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Table 2- 1. EOS Documentation Requirements
Formal Submission Information Available Onsite
Project development plan Subsystem design review data
package
Test program plan Reliability predictions and
failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA)
Configuration control plan Nonstandard part justification
Cost and schedule plan Failure notification
Nonconformance reports Failure report
Parts and materials list Spacecraft acceptance data
package
Bus/payload/booster ICD's Test procedures
Product assurance plan Class 1 and 2 engineering
changes
Safety plan Test reports
Hazardous systems documents Equipment specifications
Launch support requirements Interface specifications under
contractor control
Engineering drawings Parts and material substitution
list
Budget, cost, and variance report
Preferred parts list
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3. RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
TRW studied the areas of quality assurance and reliability to deter-
mine if meaningful cost reductions could be made without jeopardizing the
quality of the spacecraft. Based on this study, we estimate that quality
assurance costs will be reduced approximately 15 percent and reliability
costs 20 percent by applying the methods described below. In the quality
assurance area we are not recommending any reduction in inspection
activities but only in some ares of quality engineering. Our specific
recommendations include:
* Utilize the existing quality manual of the integrating contractor
in lieu of a new quality plan.
* Use proven subcontractor manufacturing processes without
imposing strict conformance to government specifications
* Reduce inspection documentation
e Where possible, limit receiving inspection activities.
* Allow the contractor to control disposition of inconsequential
discrepancies with informal review by NASA.
* Use standard contractor functional audits for quality assurance
system. No special project audits should be used.
* Limit failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA's) to primarily
those areas concerning interfaces between boxes.
* Limit reliability assessment analysis.
* Limit customer documentation to summary data.
* Reduce the formality of failure reporting and analyses.
3. 1 QUALITY ASSURANCE
Most quality requirements of NHB 5300.4 (lb) are considered to be
positive contributors to a low-cost program. They provide for timely
inputs into the evolving design, and during fabrication and test they cause
early detection of defects, minimizing costly repairs. However, there
are a few modifications that would yield cost benefit without significant
increase in risk.
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* Quality Plans. Quality plans are submitted to provide the pro-
curing agency visibility that the contractor understands the
contractual quality aspects and has an organized approach to
achieve them. Typically, contractors respond with an in-depth
discussion of all controls pertinent to design, development,
fabrication, processing, assembly, inspection, test, checkout
packaging, shipping, storage, maintenance, field use, flight
preparations, flight operations, and post-flight analysis. TRW
recommends that, in lieu of an in-depth project plan, appropriate
sections of the contractor's quality manual and supporting docu-
ments are submitted, thereby reducing plan preparation and
associated coordination costs. The risk involved is minimal,
since contractors' manuals adequately describe the quality efforts
routinely conducted which meet DoD and NASA requirements.
* Specification Tradeoffs. Consideration of mission effectiveness
goals prior to the imposition of process and material specifica-
tions can yield both cost and schedule savings. Adapting proven
subcontractor manufacturing processes within the framework of
desired government of military specifications, rather than impos-
ing strict conformance to existing government specifications on
soldering, multilayer boards, and conformal coating saves both
costs and schedule time. For example, using a soft conformal
coating that can be reworked and has desirable damping charac-
teristics might be a suitable alternative for a particular applica-
tion to a hard conformal coating required by strict conformance
to specification which will be generally superior under all other
conditions.
* Design and Development Controls. Technical documents are
reviewed by personnel from various product assurance depart-
ments. For example, an equipment specification would be subject
to approval by reliability, quality assurance, and PM&P
specialists. Cost savings will result from a single review by
a product assurance engineer representing all assurance disci-
plines. Also, participation of quality assurance personnel at
design reviews could be limited to the producibility review
without significant increase in risk. However, product assurance
specialists should participate in all design reviews.
* Procurement Controls. Currently all items purchased by a con-
tractor are subject to complete verification by receiving inspec-
tion or by contractor's inspection at the supplier. A low-cost
program would identify consistently high-quality producers and
subject their deliveries to minimal verification. There is some
risk in this, of course, but the payoff could be substantial.
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* Non-Conforming Article and Materials Control. Present practice
is that when discrepant material is detected, it is segregated and
dispositioned by a board representing key contractor functions,
i.e., engineering, quality, parts, materials, and processes, etc.
When the item is to be used as is or repaired to salvage, concur-
rence of the local government representatives must be obtained.
Further, timely and effective actions are required of the contrac-
tor to prevent recurrence. Many discrepancies are inconsequen-
tial, unrelated.in any possible way to failure mode, and therefore
minimal effort should be expended at documentation, disposition,
and corrective measures, etc. Disposition authority for such
items could be assigned to quality assurance with a summary
available for customer review. Customer participation in dis-
position should be limited to end items and nonperformance
penalties substituted in the contract for end item failures.
* Audits. Special project audits would not be performed since
functional audits of all quality elements are routinely conducted
across all projects.
3. 2 RELIABILITY
By judicious deemphasis on certain aspects of traditional reliability
activities, there are some areas where costs can be reduced without
reducing the basic spacecraft reliability. In general, these are of such
a nature that they will be most effective if the contract permits some
discretionary judgements by TRW and its EOS reliability manager in the
execution of the reliability duties. The methods described here for
affecting reliability cost savings may be characterized as follows:
* The reduction of scope of specific tasks which are of doubtful
cost effectiveness
* The execution of necessary tasks in a more efficient manner
by the adoption of programmatic design groundrules consistent
with a low-cost objective.
3. 2. 1 Design Requirements
By adopting flexible design reliability requirements in the contract,
some costs can be avoided without loss of design integrity. Too often an
inflexible technical contractual clause forces the design one way, whereas
cost and risk considerations would indicate that some other course should
be followed. An example might be a clause prohibiting the e-xistence of
any single-point failures. Such a requirement could be in conflict with
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a low-cost objective. It is not uncommon for the cost of correcting a
single-point failure to be exorbitant compared to the small risk caused by
its existence. A single-point failure design criterion is less valid for a
repairable spacecraft than for previous nonrepairable spacecraft.
In a similar context, an adoption of the following design groundrules
will help to reduce spacecraft costs:
* If any single-point failure requirement is imposed, confine it to
that hardware related to keeping the spacecraft in a safe mode
and ensuring its recovery and repairability.
* Redundancy and cross-strapping levels will be determined by
performing reliability versus weight versus life-cycle cost
tradeoffs, instead of designing to an arbitrary numerical reli-
ability requirement.
* Often, designs are required to operate under the cumulative
worst-case tolerance, drift, transient, and environmental con-
ditions of all components. Since all components are unlikely to
vary to the extreme in their performance simultaneously, this
can be a very conservative groundrule which results in oversizing
components and purchase of extremely stable components. It
would be better to stipulate a required confidence that the total
configuration will not drift outside established limits.
3. 2. 2 Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analyses
The performance of a failure modes, effects, and criticality analyses
(FMECA) on each and every piece part within the spacecraft is an
inefficient procedure which produces a diminishing return as more and
more detailed analyses are undertaken, particularly where redundancy is
provided. TRW has found that, in many cases, the distinctions between
the effects of one part's failure modes and those of another may be
irrelevant to the execution of the design. In the interest of economy and
most effective utilization of engineering manpower, FMECA activities
should concentrate on those parts which a) interface with or influence a
unit's redundant counterpart (and whose failure could therefore negate the
intended redundancy), or b) interface with other units in the spacecraft.
Those parts whose failure effects are confined to their own unit should be
deemphasized.
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The practice of quantifying the criticality of failure modes, deter-
mining the probability of each failure mode's occurrence, and building
cqmplex models which weight criticality and probability will be eliminated.
3. 2. 3 Reliability Math Models
In a program where life-cycle costs can be significantly impacted by
the choice of redundancies, cross-strapping, and inherent unit reliability
levels, the generation of reliability mathematical models can provide a
meaningful contribution to the reduction of those costs. EOS is such a
program; there are significant tradeoffs to be made between increasing/
decreasing redundancy, versus the frequency of shuttle repair launches,
with cost and the availability and utility of. the system being dependent on
results of those trades. Such tradeoffs depend on the use of math models.
Therefore, reliability math models will be generated, but with significant
cost-reducing changes from current practices. Among these are:
* Whenever they do not significantly conflict with the customer's
data, the contractor's established piece part failure rates will
be used without requiring extensive research, data collection,
and documentation to prove their validity. Proof will be docu-
mented only in those instances where there is reason to doubt
the validity of the contractor's data. Ball-park failure rate
estimates will be:used whenever the reliability estimates and
resulting tradeoffs are not particularly sensitive to the value of
failure rate used.
* One set of piece-part failure rates for use at nominal (or average)
design conditions will be adopted and used across-the-board,
without adjusting them based on each one's temperature and elec-
trical stresses. This eliminates a costly procedure which only
results in fine tuning the reliability models to an unnecessary
degree. Circuit designs will, however, still be examined for use
of electronic parts under excessive stress conditions.
* Average failure rates will be used for digital, analog, and hybrid
IC's as a function of ranges of complexity level, rather than using
the time-consuming methodologies defined in MIL-HNDBK217B.
* Relaibility models will be made only to the detail and accuracy
necessary to support meaningful tradeoffs. Precise models of
switching, work arounds, backup modes, partial failures, etc.,
simply for the purpose of accuracy will be avoided.
* Reliability modeling will cease at design freeze and will not be
updated following that time since the models will have already
served their purpose in guiding prefreeze tradeoffs.
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3. 2. 4 Documentation
The creation, preparation, reproduction, and distribution of docu-
mentation can be very expensive and can consume significant time of key
personnel. Therefore, it will be minimized in a variety of ways. Among
these are: use of summaries for the customer, with backup detailed data
available for review on request (e.g., tradeoffs, mathematical models,
FMECA's, failure report histories), submission of informal material for
backups (e.g., work sheets, handwritten failure reports); minimization
of reporting frequency; limiting distributions.
3. 2. 5 Failure Reporting and Corrective Action
The failure reporting system is composed of a number of forms,
procedures, and review boards, all of which TRW feels play indispensable
roles in reducing total program costs by detailing design and manufactur-
ing problems early, thereby avoiding more expensive problems later in
the manufacture/test cycle and in-orbit. However, on the successful
NASA Pioneer Jupiter program, it was demonstrated that significant cost
savings can be achieved by reducing the formalities associated with
documentation of failures and failure analyses. Similar procedures
should be implemented on EOS. However, established internal and
customer review of logs of failures, their causes, and disposition should
be rigorously maintained.
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4. PARTS PROGRAM
The EOS program presents unusual requirements and opportunities
for utilizing high-reliability electronic parts. Since the basic spacecraft
module designs have a life cycle of 10 to 15 years, the parts program
must ensure that the same parts are available over this period of time.
Since many modules of the same design will be built, the volume of parts
will be significantly higher than a typical one or two spacecraft program,
and this affords the opportunity for large consolidated purchases. Sched-
ule problems in supplying high-reliability parts will be significantly
reduced.
In the following sections, we discuss the various parts procurement
approaches and outline a program which meets the EOS requirements,
while recognizing the possible fiscal constraints. The program is a sig-
nificant departure from past NASA procurements, but we believe it pro-
vides the best solution for the EOS program.
4.1 BACKGROUND
Part failures in assembled hardware (especially after conformal
coating) have cost some programs millions of dollars in analysis, correc-
tion, and retrofit costs. While it' is cost-effective to eliminate defective
parts (especially generically defective) early in hardware production,
there are several schools of thought on the optimum way to do this, each
valid in some applications. Practical, economic programs are likely to
consist of flexible strategies for the particular case. Certainly, rigid
and overconstrained parts programs have proved repeatedly to be costly
and not notably effective in producing high reliability.
The principal past approaches to procurement of defect-free parts
can (with some oversimplification) be described as follows:
* Produce parts on a captive line exclusively for the program with
the utmost care, and avoid direct cost and schedule pressure.
This approach can be highly successful when the program needs
Lan sustain reasonable volume continuous production, and when
the capital costs are consistent with the program funding and
schedule. This approach is only viable for NASA programs for
production of limited quantity esoteric devices (e. g., special
sensors which could not otherwise be obtained at all).
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* Impose on an existing commercial part extraordinary inspection,
test, and process control requirements constraining the manu-
facturer to produce an essentially defect-free product. This has
in the past tended to be the military and aerospace approach to
procurement of high-reliability semiconductors, and can be very
effective when practical for NASA programs. Two difficulties
are apparent in present market conditions: 1) the volume of any
one procurement tends to be so low that the lot-dependent costs
become prohibitive; and 2) most manufacturers find a ready
market for their standard product in large quantities and are
reluctant to accept small orders whose requirements disrupt
their production system. (TRW is overcoming some of these
difficulties by embarking on standard stock procurement of high-
reliability parts with a limited capital investment.)
* Procure the best commercially available part and perform lot
qualification and screening tests independent of the manufacturer.
Several programs have demonstrated that this approach can be
effective and economical, and minimizes procurement lead time.
Some risks are implicit, however, in this type of procurement.
The most significant is that the yield of an acceptable product
through all screening tests may turn out to be inherently zero.
This can occur for a number of reasons, the most obvious being
that the manufacturer has already screened out the most desir-
able parts for sale at a premium, so that the commercial part
contains none of the desired characteristics. There is also the
danger that the manufacturer may at some point make a process
change that is acceptable to his commercial customers, but
renders the part unsuitable for spacecraft use.
In addition to the various part procurement approaches, the EOS
program presents choices in the contracting arrangements to supply
parts for the initial EOS program of one or two spacecraft, including the
payloads, as well as the follow-on programs utilizing the same module
designs, even though they could conceivably be manufactured by another
contractor.
TRW has studied the many unique and diverse requirements of the
EOS program and has recommended an approach which satisfies both the
short- and long-range objectives of the EOS modular design. The recom-
mended approach is described in the following section.
4. 2 RECOMMENDED PROGRAM
TRW recommends that the spacecraft integration contractor for
the initial EOS procurement set up a central parts procurement program
which will supply parts for all phases of the EOS program, including
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follow-on phases where the module designs are the same. Since the
spacecraft integration contractor for the initial EOS spacecraft may not
be the contractor for all the follow-on phases, NASA should set up a sep-
arate contract for parts procurement, since this gives NASA more flexi-
bility in awarding follow-on competitive contracts for the bus module.
By setting up a central parts procurement contract in this rrianner,
the purchase volume of parts is raised to the level necessary to get parts
suppliers to agree to meet the high-reliability parts requirements,
including special screening tests and lot control. In addition, it allevi-
ates the severe schedule problems for procurement of high-reliability
parts, except for possibly the initial EOS procurement. Even in this
case, the schedule should be improved, since the volume of part orders
will be sufficiently large to get more attention and a better response from
the part suppliers.
Since the payload instrument contractors will be under contract
many months before the spacecraft system contractor is on-board, the
central parts procurement plan will not have the same impact on the pay-
load as on the bus modules.. However, the plan should still be of signifi-
cant use since the payloads are expected to utilize a large percentage of
the standardized parts from the central procurement. The relative time
phasing of the payload contract and the spacecraft system contract will
have some effect on just how many parts the payload contractors can use.
Therefore, it is recommended that the payload contractor be directed to
work with the system dontractor in the selection of standardized parts and
also to examine his design for possible modifications to increase the per-
centage of standardized parts.
The following sections outline the specific requirements for a cen-
trali'zed parts procurement program and also give estimates for the costs
necessary to implement such a program.
4.3 PARTS PROCUREMENT PROGRAM
4. 3. 1 Standardization
Maintenance of a strong part minimization and standardiziation pro-
gram is essential to avoid parts failures in assemblies and to minimize
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other program costs. The design approach for bus functions will therefore
be to use the standard parts (described below) as the basis of design,
accepting other compromises whenever possible to avoid the use of non-
standard parts. Designers proposals to use nonstandard parts will be
justifiable largely on the grounds that the function cannot otherwise be
performed. It is anticipated that nonstandard part usage in bus functions
will be less than 10 percent of total part types.
Payload equipment will use standard parts as far as possible. How-
ever, experience indicates that extreme part standardization efforts are
not cost effective for payloads for the following reasons:
* New and unusual parts are frequently implicity in the definition
of the experiment, especially in sensor interfaces. Attempts to
force part standaridization in these cases are therefore inher-
ently contradictory.
* Payloads are frequently designed and produced under the close
personal care of the principal investigator under university
laboratory conditions. Attempts to apply central spacecraft
requirements in this environment demotivate everyone con-
cerned without any compensating gain.
* Paylod procurement is frequently not synchronized with bus pro-
curement, which can lead to attempting retroactive standardiza-
tion. This is both costly and ineffective.
Payload contractors will therefore be encouraged to use standard
parts, but will be permitted freedom to adapt nonstandard parts within
other program constraints. The strongest motivating factors to use the
standard parts is that they will be available from a central procurement
source with no schedule or procurement problems.
Standard parts will be stocked by the prime contractor and supplied
as GFE to all spacecraft as defined above. Nonstandard parts will be
procured by the using contractor in accordance with requirements below.
Part stock quantities will be selected in light of part availability and qual-
ity projections so as to minimize program costs. In some cases (e. g.,
low usage critical semiconductors) the procurement may be made in
anticipation of the total usage for the whole program duration. In others
(e. g., most ERMIL parts), the procurement may be sufficient only to
minimize schedule risk. Nonstandard part procurement will be within
the scope of the hardware production contracts.
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4.3.2 Standard Part Selection and Stocking
Parts will be selected for standard stock in accordance with the
following guidelines:
* The part has satisfactory prior use history in comparable
applications.
* There is a manufacturer willing to supply the part now and
planning to continue manufacture for at least 5 years, or the
procurement can feasibly be made once only for the whole
program.
* A body of application on proper use (including derating) of the
part is readily available prior to procurement. Especially,
worst-case initial and end-of-life tolerances must be available
at start of design.
* The technology of the part is such that it can reasonably be
expected to be useful for the program duration (note that com-
promise between this goal and the first item may be necessary).
Standard parts usage (assuming redundancy is used only in a few
key areas) has been roughly estimated on the assumption that 90 percent
of the bus and 80 percent of the payload are standard parts, and that the
payload on the average contains about the same number of parts as the
bus. The bus part count for the minimum mission is approximately
19, 300 parts. Therefore, the standard parts in one spacecraft including
the payload is estimated as follows:
17, 100 IC's
2, 850 Transistor
1,710 Diodes
11,400 Passive parts
33, 060
Present prices of electronic parts are estimated from costs of
TRW standard stock purchase and average lot buys are as follows:
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Large Lot Price ( > 1000) Small lot (< 1000)
IC $36 $70
Transistor $35 $65
Diode $16 $34
Resistors and capacitors $0.50 to $3. 00 $0. 75 to $4. 00
From the preceding prices, it is evident that significant cost savings
can be made if the standard lot purchases are greater than 1000 parts
except for passive parts. It is expected that a high percentage of pas-
sive parts can be purchased as ERMIL, which are more readily available
from parts suppliers in small quantities than the active parts and will not
require large lot procurement.
In the absence of any standardization program, experience indicates
that most of the spacecraft parts will be small lot quantities. Making the
extreme assumptions of all small lot versus all large lot buys, the maxi-
mum possible cost benefit of central stocking per spacecraft is approxi-
mately $700, 000 for purchase of active parts.
Assuming that the active parts in question belong to about 400 types
without standardization for a single spacecraft, the average lot size of
active parts is then only about 50 parts. This is consistent with current
spacecraft experience averaged over both bus functions and payload (and
without allowance for test items, attrition, etc.). A reasonable goal
should be that the total number of types stocked in active parts should be
of the order 100 (the vast majority of types in a list of materials are
resistor and capacitor valves). The average lot size of active parts for
one spacecraft is then about 200 parts plus an assumed 30 percent allow-
ance for attrition. Cost benefit in reduced lot charges, etc., becomes
effective at lot sizes of the order 1000; hence, on the average, a benefit
is realized by stocking enough parts for three to five spacecraft (note that
there is considerably variability about this average). The cost of active
parts assuming 3 0-percent attrition is thus $5 million, with a potential
saving of the order of $4. 5 million for a five spacecraft lot. It is possible
that some parts may have to be procured in even larger quantities to
ensure their availability for a 10-year period, but a more detailed analysis
is required to define a specific parts program for 10 years.
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While the above is at best a very rough estimate of the effects of a
standard stock program, it does indicate that substantial cost savings
are possible from a standard stock program supported by a rigorous
standardization program.
Of even greater significance is the fact the high-reliability parts
will be available for the payload and bus without compromising the quality
to meet schedules. For a modest initial investment, significant savings
can be made in the purchase of parts and even greater savings by lower-
ing the part failure rate after assembly into boxes.
4. 3. 3 Part Application
Design guidelines will be developed for each standard part laying
down specific derating requirements. General program requirements
are that:
* No significant stress exceed 50 percent of manufacturer's rated
maximum.
* Semiconductors, except specifically high-power devices, oper-
ate at junction temperatures less than 1250C.
Part derating reviews will be held as part of the design review
process.
4. 3. 4 Part Standardization Management
The system contractor establishes a parts, materials, and proc-
esses (PM and P) control board which:
* Selects standard parts
* Approves bus and nonstandard parts
* Approves deviations from application, screening, and qualifica-
tion guidelines
* Supports the failure corrective action system.
The board membership includes representatives from GSFC, and the sys-
tem contractors engineering, project, and product assurance organiza-
tions. A system of orderly escalation of appeal of disapprovals will be
established to ensure- GSFC and contractor management review of the
cost-effectiveness of the PM and P control board proceedings.
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Bus equipment subcontractors will establish sub-boards where
membership includes representatives of the subcontractors engineering,
project, and product assurance organizations, and a representative of
the system contractors PM and P control board. The sub-boards per-
form the same functions as the primary board, except all approvals are
subject to ratification by the primary board.
Payload contractors will establish systems of review of nonstandard
part use by their project management. However, interface parts used by
payload items will be standard parts (e. g., connectors, line drivers, and
receivers).
Bus nonstandard parts may be selected if the following requirements
are met:
* The function cannot within good engineering practice be per-
formed using standard parts or
* Use of standard parts to perform the function would require an
increase exceeding 10 percent in use of significant resource by
the subsystem. Significant resources are power, weight, and
manufacturing cost.
* The nonstandard part selected meets the program qualification
requirements.
Payload nonstandard parts may be selected as required to meet
performance and other requirements, and if the nonstandard part
selected meets the requirements of Section 6.
4. 3. 5 Part Testing
Three basic conditions must be met by part lots if costly failures
are to be avoided:
1) The basic design and manufacturing methods must be capable of
producing a. part having life, environmental, and electrical char-
acteristics appropriate to the environments of manufacture, test,
and use.
2) The processes by which the procured lots were made must be in
control and in accordance with the design requirements.
3) The individual pieces must have been so inspected and tested as
to eliminate (as far as is cost-effective) defects of workmanship
or processing.
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Qualification tests, lot acceptance, and screening tests for standard
parts, bus nonstandard parts, and payload nonstandard parts will be
assigned to ensure the above conditions are met.
Standard stock parts must have extensive use history in high-
reliability applications under environments exceeding those likely to be
encountered in.EOS manufacture, test, and use. Contractor and GSFC
existing preferred parts will be considered qualified.
Bus nonstandard parts should preferably have use history compar-
able with standard parts. Otherwise, type qualification testing will be
performed as follows. Any test or inspection may be omitted if existing
data are on hand:
* Appropriate mechanical environmental tests at a level exceeding
worst-case use environments.
* Step-stressing at high-temperature operation of a sample of
20 pieces representing at least three different lots to the point
all parts fail. Data from this test will be used to ensure the
intended application has adequate derating, and as a basis for
lot qualification.
* Radiation exposure for externally mounted or parts expected to
have unusual sensitivity.
* At least one part from each of three different lots shall undergo
destructive construction analysis to ensure adequacy of design
and construction and provide a comparison base for lot testing.
Payload nonstandard parts may be qualified by similarity, prior
use, or test. If the same part, or a part of similar design and construc-
tion, has been used successfully in comparable environments, the part
may be considered qualified. Otherwise, qualification tests will be per-
formed. Judgment of the validity of qualification data and formulation of
the test requirements will be the responsibility of the PM and P control
board.
Bus standard and nonstandard parts will be subject to the same lot
qualification requirements as follows:
* Three parts of each received lot will be subject to destructive
analysis to ensure adequacy of design, construction, and
workmanship.
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" Five parts of each lot will undergo step-stress testing under
high-temperature operating conditions to destruction. Results
must demonstrate adequate margin over any intended use, and
in the case of nonstandard parts must be within the range of
results experienced in type qualification.
* Parts subject to mechanical environmental damage will be sub-
ject to tests exceeding any use environment. Selection of the
requirements must be made on an individual type basis, follow-
ing the general guidelines of Table 4-1.
Lot qualification of payload parts will not normally be required
because of the high cost of lot qualification on small quantities. Assur-
ance of the quality of the lot would be provided, in part, by performance
of destructive analysis of three samples. Certain critical parts may be
proposed by the PM and P control board for special lot qualification
requirements, which may be performed by the prime contractor.
Bus parts will be screened to the requirements of Table 4-1,
except that existing GSFC or contractor specifications of known effective-
ness and comparable requirements may be substituted. Screening will
preferably be performed by the manufacturer with source inspection by
the contractor. In the event that procurement of tested parts with the
indicated inspection is not practical (i. e., no supplier can be found
within practical cost and schedule constraints), screening will be per-
formed by the contractor using subcontract facilities as necessary. (Pre-
cap inspection cannot then be obtained.) Parts so tested will be subject
to failure analysis of catastrophic screening fallout, with lot jeopardy if
the results indicate a generic problem.
Payload nonstandard parts will be screened to the requirements of
Table 4-2 or existing comparable specifications of known effectiveness.
Screening may be performed by the manufacturer with source inspection
by the contractor, or by an independent facility. In the event the screen-
ing is performed by the manufacture, three samples of each received lot
shall be subject to destructive evaluation of construction and workman-
ship. If screening is performed independently, failure analysis of cata-
strophic screening fallout will be performed with lot jeopardy if the
results indicate a generic problem.
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Table 4-1. Parts Screening Requirements
_0 X - Required screening Seal Maxim un/Mini mun
O - Required screening Temperature Stabilization (Gross and and Delta Limits Hours
included in MIL Cycle Vibration Acceleration Bake Fine Leak) (Where Applicable) (Burn-in) X-Ray
specification
Capacitor, cermaic ERMIL 0 O 0 X
1 Capacitor, cermaic high stability X X x
Capacitor, ceramic chip X X 168
Capacitor, solid tantalum
(ERMIL) O O O 0 X
Capacitor, foil tantalum X X X 168 X.
Capacitor, glass X X X 96
Capacitor, porcelain chip X X 168
Capacitor, mica X X 168 X
Capacitor, mylar and polystyrene .X X 168 X
Capacitor, polycarbonate X X X 168 X
Connector, electrical Mechanical inspection only
Diode, JANTX/JANTXV O O O O O 96 X
Diode, general X X X X X 168 X
Microcircuits: - Monolithic lIIC x X X X X 240 X
Hybrid, Mono X X X X X 240 X
-I DIIC
Magnetics, transformer,
inductor
Relay, GP and latch NX X X 5000:::
Resistor, metal film (ERMIL) O 0 0
Resistor, metal film chip X X 96
Resistor, metal film, Ili-Meg X X 96
Resistor, wirewound (ERMIL)
power
Resistor, wirewound (ERMIL) 0
accur
Resistor, variable (ERMIL) O 0
Resistor, carbon composition
(ERMIL)
Resistor, temperature X N 9t
sensitive
Resistor, networks (hermetic) X X X 96
Transistor, JANTX/JANTXV O O O O O 168 X
Transistor, general X X X X X 168 X
Filter feedthrough X X X 250 X
Fuses X X 168 X
RF devices By individual division
MIL-38570-CL-A or B requires no further testing
Cycles
Table 4-2. Payload Nonstandard Parts Survey
X - Required Screening
O - Required screening Seal
included in MIL Temperature Stabilization (Gross and Maxinum/Minimum flours
specification Cycle Vibration Acceleration Bake Fine) Leak and Delta Limits (Burn-in)
Capacitor, ceramic ERMIL O 0 0
Capacitor, cermaic high stability X X 96
Capacitor, ceramic chip X X 96
Capacitor, solid tantalum O O O 0
(ERMIL)
Capacitor, foil tantalum X X X 96
Capacitor, glass X X
Capacitor, porcelain chip X X
Capacitor, mica X X 96
Capacitor, mylar and X X 96
polystyrene
Capacitor, polycarbonate X X X 96
Connector, electrical Mechanical inspection only
Diode, JANTX/JANTXV:: O O O O O 0
Diode, general X X X X 96
Microcircuits':: - Monolithic
JIIC X X X X X 168
- Hybrid, mono
DIIC x X X X X 168
Magnetics, transformer, X X X
inductor
Relay, GP and latch X X X X 5000;::
Resistor, metal film (ERMIL) O 0 0
Resistor, metal film chip X X 96
Resistor, metal film, Hi-meg X X 96
Resistor, wirewound (ERMIL) 0 0
power
Resistor, wirewound (ERMIL) 0 0 0
accur
Resistor, variable (ERMIL) 0 0
Resistor, carbon composition
(ERMIL)
Resistor, temperature sensitive X X 96
Resistor, networks (hermetic) X X X 96
Transistor, JANTX/JANTXV:* O O O O O 0
Transistor, general X X X X X 168
Filter feedthrough X X X 250
Fuses X X 96
RF devices By individual decision
Cycles
TX parts from some suppliers may require additional testing.
MIL 38510 Level A or B requires no further testing
4. 3. 6 Data System
Several measures will be taken to ensure the timely collection and
distribution of information of parts problems and solutions. The system
contractor will establish a system by which part problems are reviewed
by the PM and P control board, and by which the board recommends cor-
rective action for management-review of cost-effectiveness. Failed parts
will be collected during all manufacturing operations, and an investigation
made under direction of the PM and P control board when one of the fol-
lowing conditions occurs:
* Numerous parts of the same type fail, causing cost and schedule
jeopardy
* The part failure or failure mode is unexpected
* The part failing is critical to the successful operation of the bus
* Corrective action systems operative during integration and test
will use the PM and P control board as the primary resource for
part problem resolution.
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5. CONTRACTING. APPROACH
We have analyzed the types of contracts, the contract incentives,
and the various contractor relationships that could be applied to the EOS
program. We recommend the following as providing an effective contract
approach at the lowest possible cost.
* NASA continues as the contracting agency for the payload
throughout the program. This approach provides the greatest.
confidence and the lowest cost, since NASA already has an
experienced team developing EOS instruments.
* A combination CPIF/CPAF contract is used for the systems
integrator. CPIF incentives are used on cost and measurable
parameters, while CPAF incentives are used on nonquantifiable
parameters, such as management performance and payload
interface management.
* The Contract Changes clause is eliminated and every departure
from the original negotiated agreement is done by bilateral
action (Supplemental Agreement). This eliminates questionable
changes and decreases the cost of contract change administration.
* The contract provides zero fee for all contractor initiated
changes and doubles the fee rate for all NASA-directed changes.
This reduces the amount of change activity.
* All program cost savings originated by the contractor are
shared on a predetermined percentage basis to motivate the
contractor to cut costs.
* A formal contractor program.is implemented for cost awareness
and personnel motivation.
The following paragraphs summarize the rationale for these recom-
mendations and discuss the means of implementing them in the EOS
program.
5. 1 CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIPS
The major factors which affect the selection of the contracting
approach are:
* The instrument contractors are selected by NASA and placed
under contract to NASA 4 to 8 months before the system inte-
gration contractor is selected.
5-1
" Integrating the instruments into the spacecraft is the system
integration contractor's responsibility.
* The system integration contractor may either build or subcon-
tract complete spacecraft modules.
The most significant factor is the one concerning the payload con-
tractors. In the EOS program, payload instruments fall into various
categories from fully developed. to early feasibility breadboarding.
Because of the long lead times required for development of some payload
instruments, NASA desires to begin development of certain payload instru-
ments before the system contractor is selected. The awards for these
payload elements could come in early 1975, several months before the
system contractor is selected. Hence, there is a potential problem in
conducting these contracts which are out of phase with each other.
There are two approaches for handling this integration:
1) NASA could continue as the contracting agency for the payload
for the life of the program, and the system contractor would
assume responsibility for all interface control, integration, and
checkout. In addition, the system contractor could perform sys-
tem engineering and technical direction of the payload under the
direction of NASA.
2) After selection of the system contractor, the system contractor
could assume full responsibility for development of the payload,
and integrate the NASA-initiated contract into the total contract
for the spacecraft.
In the first approach, if NASA continued as the procuring agency for
the payload and used the system contractor as a technical advisor (an SE
and TD contractor), there would be no perturbation to the payload con-
tractor caused by the redelegation of authority to the system contractor.
In addition, the payload development would proceed in the direction
desired by NASA throughout the total development phase. In this approach,
the payload would become GFE to the systems contractor and NASA would
retain responsibility for all performance and contractual elements.
In the second approach, when the system contractor takes over the
payload development he must negotiate an acceptable contract with the
payload contractor, add the administrative burden costs and profits thereon
to his own contract, and establish a management and technical team to
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direct the payload contract, thus overall causing program costs to
increase. However, this approach places full program responsibility in
one place and should allow NASA to reduce its administrative and tech-
nical costs.
After examining the pros and cons of these two approaches, TRW
concluded that the best approach would be for NASA to continue as the
contracting agency for the payload throughout the program since the
approach would ensure steady continuity in the critical area of the pay-
load. Since NASA. already has an experienced team developing instru-
ments for EOS, this team should continue in that capacity in order that
NASA has the highest confidence in achieving the.performance objectives.
The system contractor should be responsible for maintaining the interface
control between the payload and the spacecraft bus. In addition, the sys-
tem contractor would be available to assist NASA in performing tradeoff
studies and resolving difficult interface problems.
5.2 CONTRACT TYPE
5. Z. 1 Multiple Incentive Contracts
Incentive contracting is intended to align the contract's motivation
with the government's program objectives through the application of profit
incentives for technical and schedule as well as cost performance.
Assuming the incentives have been structured to truly mirror the govern-
ment's objectives, the results depend primarily on whether the basic con-
cepts of incentives are properly applied throughout the life of the contract.
Numerous government-sponsored surveys have been made to determine
the effectiveness of incentive contracting. Though some may disagree,
some of the conclusions are: that incentive contracts are indeed more
effective than CPFF contracts, that they do not impede attainment of
technical objectives, and that the concept is sound.
In general, there has been an overreaction in using multiple incen-
tive contracts for work in the early development phases merely for the
sake of having an incentive contract, or to meet some preestablished
quota for incentive contracts. Such premature application of incentive
contracts on programs where there is not an adequate degree of definition
and clarity of objectives hinders both the government and the contractor
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in achieving the overall objectives of the program. For example, too
early lock-in on technical objectives may cause research work to be sub-
verted into design studies and thereby minimize the evaluation of technical
alternatives.
To avoid such problems, multiple incentive contracts should be used
only for programs, or phases of programs, in which the objectives are
clearly defined and sufficiently stable to permit a continuing management
toward firm objectives. The writing of work statements for incentive
contracts is particularly critical because of the necessary direct relation-
ship between the degree of explicitness in defining the work and the type
of contract being used. Multiple incentive contracts should be used only
if work statements and specifications are sufficiently detailed, complete,
and firm. Conversely, when the government desires maximum flexibility
during contract performance, a CPFF type contract should be used.
5. 2. 2 Award Fee Contracting
Cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) incentive contracts are increasingly
being used by NASA. Under CPAF contracts, the contractor is periodic-
ally awarded fee as determined subjectively and unilaterally by a govern-
ment board employing specified evaluation criteria. Although originally
associated for use with maintenance and operation type efforts, the CPAF
contract now is being used to apply incentive techniques to more sophisti-
cated contract efforts that cannot easily be evaluated objectively. Again,
CPAF contracts can and do effectively motivate contractors but only to
the degree they are properly administered.
The occasional practice of funding CPAF contracts at less than the
maximum fee has the very realistic effect of limiting the awards received,
and thereby demotivates the contractor. In effect, such action conveys
the message "this is the most the government really plans to pay for
awards" and the government evaluators tend to respond accordingly.
Moreover, in an environment of tight government budgets, the government
project manager is unlikely to request additional funding in order to
award his contractor. Fully funding the maximum fee is necessary for
full effectiveness of CPAF contracting, and certainly increases the con-
tractor's motivation.
5-4
The CPAF contract evaluation criteria must specify those areas of
contract performance that the government considers most. important for
the successful accomplishment of the job; they must be as specific as
possible rather than merely an outline in broad terms. Both the govern-
ment evaluators and the contractor must have a mutual understanding of
the meaning, intent, and relative weightings of the criteria.
The key to effective CPAF contracting is timely feedback to the con-
tractor, providing an evaluation of his strong and weak points so that he
may correct his performance deficiencies during the next evaluation
period. When such feedback does not occur, the inherent benefits of
CPAF contracting can be completely eliminated.
5. 2. 3 Recommendations for EOS Contract Type
In establishing a specific method for implementing contract concepts,
we must use those factors which will most effectively motivate both con-
tractor and NASA personnel ' optimize program goals. Since, for EOS,
we interpret the primary goa_ to be adequate technical performance at
the lowest practical cost, we believe the type of contact most appropriate
for the EOS hardware phase is a combination of CPIF and CPAF for the
systems integrator. In the prime contract, we recommend objective
CPIF incentives on cost, as well as other program parameters which are
susceptible to precise quantification and measurement. We recommend
subjective CPAF incentives on those program aspects, such as flight
performance, management performance, payload interface management,
subcontract management, etc., which are not capable of objective
assessment.
We have reviewed the question of low-cost contracting techniques
for subcontractors and concluded that the choice of contracting techniques
is limited. Other than the instrument subcontracts, the dollar content of
individual subcontracts is not large enough to make an appreciable impact.
With that view in mind, the following concepts/ideas are offered as poten-
tially productive:
* Use fixed-price incentive subcontractswhere the potential for
saving cost is probable. Typically, a fixed-price subcontract
presents the best assurance of change and cost control, and is
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therefore, generally the preferred method of subcontracting.
Incentives on cost (and possibly schedule) may present cost sav-
ing opportunities but could be disastrous if coupled with a loose
specification.
* Consider the use of on-site resident representatives where
expediting direction during the development, manufacturing,
and test phases is critical to cost/schedule. Moreover, on-site
engineering, subcontracts, and product assurance representa-
tives could facilitate closer management control and surveillance
with a minimum of data and reporting requirements.
* A corollary of the resident representatives, cited above, is more
visits to subcontractors and, therefore closer surveillance facil-
itating management control, communication, and direction with
fewer documentation requirements.
In implementing the recommended CPIF/CPAF contract for the EOS
program, we recommend the following procedures for administering the
incentive.
5. 2. 3. 1 Award Fee Categories
The basic performance evaluation categories for developing an
award fee structure should include program management, technical, sub-
contracts management, and flight performance. Each of these categories
have several subdivisions which are illustrated in Figure 5-1. Most of
these subdivisions are discussed in detail in other sections of this volume.
AWARD
FEE
FLIGHT PERFORMANCE
AWARD AWARD
WEIGHT % WEIGHT %
MISSION ASSURANCE
OPERATIONS SUPPORT
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT
SCIENCE AND DATA RETURN PERFORMANCE PERFORMANCE
SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE WEIGHT % WEIGHT %
- INTERFACES - ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
REVIEWS - SUBCONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT
- CONFIGURATION CONTROL - CONTRACTS AND CHANGE
PROPOSALS
- RESPONSIVENESS
- CORPORATE SUPPORT
- PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
AND RESOLUTION PLANNING - PLANS AND SCHEDULES
- TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT - DOCUMENTATION
- SCHEDULE DELIVERY - SUBCONTRACT MANAGEMENT
CONFORMANCE
QUALITY AND SIGNIFICANCE
OF WORK
Figure 5-1. EOS Award Fee Evaluation Categories
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5. 2. 3. 2 Evaluation Procedures
For purpose of periodic award fee evaluation, a contractor award
fee evaluation board should be established with membership normally
restricted to project manager level. The organization for the award fee
process is shown in Figure 5-2. The contracting officer should provide
in advance of each scheduled evaluation period a written evaluation plan
which indicates selected areas of performance of particular interest for
that period. The relative weighting and importance of each period should
be specified in advance by NASA. The relative weighting should be
expected to change among the award fee categories for the different
periods depending upon the importance of each category in a particular
period.
FEE AWARD REVIEW RIGHT OF
DETERMINATION T APPEAL
OFFICIAL (FINAL I
DETERMINATION)
AWARD FEE
FEE CONTRACTING CONTRACTOR
RECOMMENDATION OFFICER
RECOMMENDATIONS
AWARD FEE
EVALUATION -
BOARD
PERIODIC PRESENTATIONS
- r
MONTHLY DISCUSSIONS (PROJECT)
AND QUARTERLY SUMMARIES (CORPORATE)
MANAGEMENT TECHNICAL
EVALUATION EVALUATION
COORDINATOR COORDINATOR
INTERNAL MONTHLY REPORT
TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE MONITORS
Figure 5-2. Award Fee Process
At the conclusion of each evaluation period, the contractor should
prepare a brief self evaluation of progress for consideration by the
evaluation board. The board should receive reports from its own
evaluation. A joint review session should then be held between the
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contractor and evaluation board to exchange points of view. Subsequent
to this meeting, the board would submit its recommendation to the award
evaluation authority.
Fees not awarded in any given period should be considered avail-
able for assignment to succeeding periods for possible awards later.
Such retention of the pool would maximize motivation to encourage better
performance on the part of the contractor.
5. 2. 3. 3 Cost Awareness and Personnel Motivation
To make a low-cost achievement plan work on the EOS program,
employees must be made aware of the low-cost goals, be given ideas how
to achieve them, and be motivated to take positive action to meet these
goals.
A concerted effort must be made to foster cost awareness through-
out the contractor's organization. Positive actions should be taken to
encourage new cost-saving ideas, techniques, and procedures, and to
encourage expression of ideas, even if they are unconventional. There
should be a continuous program to indoctrinate and motivate personnel
to search for techniques for reducing costs. Several techniques and pro-
cedures designed to motivate personnel to reduce costs are recommended
for EOS.
* Workshops. The contractor should conduct training and motiva-
tion sessions for managers and supervisors. Special consultants
should be used to explain techniques and guidelines.
* Management Presentation. At key points in the schedule, top
management should address all the team members to show total
company commitment to the project.
* Incentives. Special recognition should be given to employees for
innovative and imaginative efforts which result in savings of cost
or time. Monetary awards, plaques, letters of recognition, and
public acknowledgement are typical incentives which would be
considered.
These activities should be planned to reach all levels of the program
since cost-saving ideas can and do come from all levels of the team.
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5.3 CONTRACT CHANGES AND TECHNICAL DIRECTION
5.3.1 General
There is no question that changes and redirection of technical work
increase the cost of performing the work. This is true, regardless of
whether the change is occasioned by the contractor's design, manufactur-
ing, or testing requirements; or whether the change results from the
customer's revision of the drawings, specifications, or other require-
ments of the contract.
To achieve cost optimization on EOS, changes should be minimized;
and the few changes that are made must be implemented early in the pro-
gram, when their effect can be tolerated. Well defined specifications and
interface control documents must be fully agreed to prior to initiation of
the work.
5. 3. 2 Some Innovative Concepts to Minimize Changes
5. 3. 2. 1 Eliminate the Changes Clause
We recommend that the Changes Clause not be used for the EOS.
procurement. If there were no changes clause, every departure from the
original negotiated agreement would have to be accomplished by bilateral
action (Supplemental Agreement). These actions would involve more
rigor and discipline, and there would be fewer changes. Moreover,
there is an opportunity for cost-saving in the area of contract change
administration. This would not preempt the rights of either party, but
would ensure full understanding of the cost impact of a potential change
before its authorization.
Some analysts of government procurement experience have claimed
that prolific use of the standard changes clause has increased program
costs as high as 40 percent, with questionable program advantages.
5. 3. 2.2 Use Fee to Limit Changes
There is a high-degree of sensitivity to fee or profit on the part of
government and the contractor. Government personnel generally resist
the application of fee, while contractors are motivated to press for it.
This dynamic situation could be utilized effectively to reduce changes.
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It is recommended that the contract provide zero fee for all contractor-
initiated changes, and double the fee rate of the contract for all NASA
directed changes. This would undoubtedly reduce the amount of change
activity on EOS.
5. 3. 2. 3 Share Savings Where Change Reduces Cost
In those instances where the contractor is able to devise techniques
to reduce program cost, then such savings should be shared on a pre-
determined percentage basis. To accommodate this concept, it is recom-
mended that the current Value Engineering provision covered under
Item VIII of DoD DPC-121 be incorporated in the EOS contract special
provisions. Such a concept can effectively motivate the contractor to
identify and implement cost savings ideas which would be of overall bene-
fit to the program.
5. 3. 3 Handling Changes and Technical Direction
Four types of changes are possible on the EOS program:
1) Contract change notices (if the Change Clause is used)
2) Engineering change proposals
3) Cost offset proposals
4) Technical direction.
This section describes how technical and administrative changes
should be handled and highlights the differences between proposed new
cost-related procedures and those used on previous spacecraft contracts.
Application of these new procedures by both TRW and NASA/GSFC should
result in a lower cost at completion.
5. 3. 3. 1 Contract Change Notices
These unilateral changes, directed by NASA under the Changes
Clause, direct the contractor to proceed with the work as charged. The
contractor is required to advise NASA of any resultant change in cost,
fee, or schedule. In the past the contract change notice (CCN) has
resulted in management decisions that frequently have been made without
enough advance information as to the impact of such decisions on the pro-
gram. Although rough order of magnitude cost estimates (ROM's) have
5-10
been made and verbal discussions have taken place between the parties
before CCN issuance, detailed cost tradeoffs have not always been made.
Occasionally there has been a sharp divergence between the contractor's
claim for equity and NASA's expectation of the cost (or other) impact of
the change that was directed. At times the CCN would not have been
issued if the magnitude of the impact had been known early enough. In
other cases, the terms of the CCN (i. e., specification limits) would
have been altered to optimize the technical risk versus cost impact.
For EOS, a contract change procedure is suggested that will signi-
ficantly reduce costs. The concept is simple: the problems described
above will be avoided by 1) maximum precoordination between NASA and
the contractor of all potential changes; 2) quick assessment by the con-
tractor of the impact of changes on the program, followed immediately
by interface meetings between all affected parties,. including science and
launch vehicle people, if necessary; and 3) at least tentative agreement on
what the impact is before the change is implemented. Such a procedure
will not be easy to implement, especially where time is a problem. But,
if the impact is judged to be significant, then this cost/technical tradeoff
is absolutely essential. If the proposed change is deemed to be worth
the cost of implementation, then it should be negotiated. However, if
there is a more cost-effecitve solution that is technically feasible, then
the contractor should be permitted to proceed with it. Figure 5-3 illus-
trates the proposed change procedure.
REQUIREMENT NASA/GSFC QUICK LOOK AT ROM ISSUED QUICK TRADEOFF R ENTS
CHANGE COONATON TB ND DSCSSED ORDINATION AND
BY NASA ROM WITH ALL PARTIES
NO
CHANGE
STOP
NASA/GSFC
ISSUES CHANGE MPCHANGE ADJUSTMENT NEGOTIATION
BASED ON .IMPLEMENTED MODIFICATION
IMPACT PROPOSED
AGREEMENT
Figure 5-3. EOS Project Change Procedure
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5. 3. 3. 2 Engineering Change Proposals
Engineering change proposals (ECP's) may either be originated by
the contractor or solicited by NASA/GSFC. In either case, an ECP is
bilateral and can only be incorporated into the contract by means of a
supplemental agreement signed by both parties. The ECP is susceptible
to the same pitfalls as the CCN. Contractors frequently initiate work
contemplated by an ECP before receipt of a fully signed Supplemental
Agreement. Because of time pressures, the contractor normally acts on
a contracting officer's letter of authorization to proceed, with no prior
impact understanding or agreement. Also, the true cost versus technical
requirement tradeoff is insufficient to ensure that the decision is right.
Even with the ECP on the desk in front of him, the NASA/GSFC decision-
maker may be tempted to make his tradeoff on the basis of what he feels
he can negotiate, rather than the impact proposed by the contractor.
Accordingly, until there is thorough coordination across all interfaces,
and at least tentative agreement as to total impact, the change should not
be implemented.
For the EOS Phase C/D, we propose to improve the discipline with
which ECP's are handled. Out goal is to achieve this discipline without
introducing the type of rigidity that hampers technical work, while keep-
ing costs low. This can only be successful if there is cost sensitivity
and cooperation at all levels of the contractor and NASA organization.
Figure 5-4 illustrates the ECP procedure.
5. 3. 3. 3 Cost Offset Proposal
The cost offset proposal is a relatively new concept in government
contracting. It has emerged as a direct result of the low-cost philosophy
of the 1970's and is not as formal as a CCN or an ECP. Basically, the
idea is that the overall mission and project cost are the dominant elements
of the program, while detailed specifications and other lower level
requirements are secondary. If a specification value is a significant cost
driver, and if that value can be altered without jeopardizing the mission,
then it is a candidate for change even if some technical risk may be intro-
duced into the program by reduction of design margins or technical
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contengencies. These deviations or waivers to the agreed-on specifica-
tions or other contract reqcuirements have met with considerable
resistance in the past.
CONTRACTOR AND QUICK PREPARE NEGOTIATE
IDENTIFIES DESIRED TRADEOFF OF ECP CHANGE (S/A)CHANGE AND REQUIREMENTS
ESTIMATES COST VERSUS COST
NOT COST STO PEFFECTIVE
NASA/GSFC ROM REQUESTED
IDENTIFIES AND COST VERSUS -
DESIRED SCOPE REQUIREMENTS RFP ISSUED
CHANGE . TRADEOFFS MADE
Figure 5-4. Engineering Change Proposal Procedure
We recommend that the cost offset proposal be used in EOS, and
that the contractor be directed to look for ways to offset any cost growth
that may develope from unexpected technical problems. When potential
offsets are identified, they will be presented to NASA/GSFC in the form
of letter proposals. These proposals may: recommend elimination of a
.prescribed test and substitution of analytical data; ask for relief on the
stated weight allowance for the spacecraft, suggest the deletion of a
report which is no longer being used; or propose a new spares philosophy.
In any case, we see the offset concept as a process for continuously
bringing the estimate-at-completion into line with the negotiated contract
cost.
Realization of NASA's objective of a low-cost EOS program may
depend on the contractor's implementation of this cost offset proposal
concept and NASA/GSFC's early response to proposal submissions.
Positive participation and action by both the contractor and NASA/GSFC
are essential.
Although cost-offset proposals are less formal than ECP's they are
handled in much the same way. A cost offset proposal may result in a
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specification change and contract modification, but it will not usually
involve a change in the estimated cost of the contract. The important
thing is that the cost offset proposal, when accepted by NASA, will result
in a lower overall cost to the government than would otherwise have been
experienced.
5. 3. 3. 4 Technical Direction
Technical direction that is within the scope of work would not result
in a claim for equity. If technical direction does not result in added
scope, we would advise the contracting officer and follow the same proce-
dure as for the changes. Regardless of the question of scope, there must
be greater discipline for EOS, particularly with respect to informal
technical direction.
The contractor needs to explore with NASA/GSFC the importance of
each directed action that is a cost driver. We believe that the contractor
team can help NA.SA/GSFC with cost tradeoff decisions and possibly offer
alternative courses of action that would lower costs. Figure 2-5 demon-
strates this concept.
In Figure 5-5, the decision to implement the change is made on the
basis of tradeoff evaluation before the question of in-scope or out-of-
scope is addressed. This is important, since the fact that a direction is
within scope does not necessarily mean that it can be accommodated at no
cost. The only distinction between the two is that in-scope direction does
not bear additional fee. When the decision to implement technical direc-
tion is made on the basis of worth to the program, then we can be sure
that this type of change will be made only when absolutely necessary.
IF WITHIN
GO ALTERNATE SCOPE,
ROUTE IMPLEMENT
DIRECTION
TECHICAL COORDINATE IMPLEMENT
DIECTN AND ESTIMATE DECISION IF SCOPEFROMDRECTONGsC MPACT CHANGE
IF CHANGE IN
SCOPE FOLLOW CHANGECHANGE
PROCEDURE
Figure 5-5. Implementation of Technical Direction Changes
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